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It seems as if Americans are always debating educational re­
forms of one sort or another.2  Over time, this tends to give any 
thinking about ways to improve the nature of education a certain 
Sisyphean quality.  And since our culture seems loath to release its 
hold on a conception of progress that understands it as unending 
improvement3, Sisyphus’s situation seems an apt metaphor for our 
own.4  In his book, Deschooling Society,5 (hereinafter Deschooling) 
Ivan Illich bases his critique of American schooling in part on an 
understanding of progress as a maddening idea.6  As he puts it, “the 
law of ‘rising expectations’ [is] a euphemism for a growing frustra­
tion gap . . . .”7  His move is to reject the idea that a system of 
perfect manipulation can be realized and result in perfect learning, 
in educational outcomes that always meet expectations.8  It is also 
to recognize that, as Orestes Brownson noted before public schools 
* Instructor of English, Virginia Tech.  An early version of this paper was 
presented at the Symposium Radical Nemesis: Re-Envisioning Ivan Illich’s Theories on 
Social Institutions at Western New England University School of Law on April 1, 2011. 
I would like to thank the WNE faculty for organizing and hosting such a wonderful 
event.  Special thanks to Erin Buzuvis for answering my countless questions and 
arranging for my transportation to and from the Symposium.  I would also like to thank 
Fritz Oehlschlaeger for reading and commenting on this paper many times during its 
development. 
1. Matthew 6:34 (New International Version). 
2. See Marcia Clemmitt, School Reform: Should Evaluation of Teachers Rest on 
Students’ Test Scores?, 21 CQ RESEARCHER 385, 394-95 (2011) (reviewing the last 20 
years of education reform debates). 
3. NEIL POSTMAN, BUILDING A BRIDGE TO THE 18TH CENTURY 24-29 (1999). 
4. IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY 109 (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., Harper & 
Row 1971). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 42-43. 
7. Id. at 108-09. 
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382 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:381 
even existed in America, “[e]ducated, in some sense, all our chil­
dren are, and will be, whether we will or not.”9 
This Article considers Ivan Illich’s critique of schools as manip­
ulative institutions, examining both the institutional spectrum he 
uses to evaluate the structure of modern schooling and the “learn­
ing webs”10 he suggests as alternative educational structures.  It 
then explores the implications of Illich’s proposed “learning webs,” 
specifically focusing on the question of where common standards 
and authority are to be found within these structures.  It concludes 
that Illich is purposefully vague in regard to standards and author­
ity, because such issues can too easily become matters of manipula­
tion and control themselves. 
I. INSTITUTIONAL SPECTRUM 
Illich’s Deschooling is really a collection of essays rather than 
one through-composed argument; its chapters present not one part 
of an argument after another but variations on the same essential 
theme.11  That argument is, as suggested above, in large part about 
the problem of institutional manipulation.  This focus makes, to my 
mind, chapter four of Deschooling, “Institutional Spectrum,” a key 
section of the book.12  In it, we get something of a manifesto from 
Illich: 
I believe that a desirable future depends on our deliberately 
choosing a life of action over a life of consumption, on our en­
gendering a life style which will enable us to be spontaneous, in­
dependent, yet related to each other, rather than maintaining a 
life style which only allows us to make and unmake, produce and 
consume—a style of life which is merely a way station on the 
road to the depletion and pollution of the environment. The fu­
ture depends more upon our choice of institutions which support 
a life of action than on our developing new ideologies and tech­
nologies.  We need a set of criteria which will permit us to recog­
nize those institutions which support personal growth rather than 
addiction, as well as the will to invest our technological resources 
preferentially in such institutions of growth.13 
9. Orestes Augustus Brownson, Review of Horace Mann’s Second Annual Report, 
2 BOST. Q. REV. 393, 394 (1839). 
10. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 72. 
11. Id. at 43. 
12. Id. at 52. 
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2012] ILLICH’S DESCHOOLING AND THE REDISCOVERY OF HOPE 383 
The institutional spectrum Illich lays out is just such a way to iden­
tify those institutions that support “a life of action over a life of 
consumption.”14  His spectrum ranges from manipulative (right­
wing) to convivial (left-wing) institutions.15  Manipulative institu­
tions, according to my reading of Illich, have three main features: 
possession, definition, and production.16  Whether it is a jail or a 
mental hospital, a right-wing institution possesses its subjects—they 
are separated, set apart.17  This setting apart allows the subjects to 
be defined as well—they are labeled as criminals, as insane.18  Fi­
nally, these institutions are concerned with the production of cer­
tain behaviors and roles.  Jails are supposed to produce civil, law-
abiding citizens; mental hospitals are supposed to produce sane, ra­
tional individuals.19 
The fundamental feature of convivial institutions, on the other 
hand, is that they allow for individual agency.20  Being free to act as 
one chooses is, after all, the opposite of being manipulated. This 
basic difference, the dichotomy of action that defines Illich’s institu­
tional spectrum, allows us to evaluate seemingly similar institutions. 
One might expect, for example, that ostensibly benevolent social 
and civil service institutions would be convivial.  Illich notes, how­
ever, that “service institutions” are found at “both extremes of the 
spectrum.”21  With right-wing institutions, “service is imposed ma­
nipulation” delivered through “highly complex and costly produc­
tion processes,” which are designed to foster consumer dependence 
on an institution’s service.22  Left-wing service institutions, on the 
other hand, provide “amplified opportunity within formally defined 
limits, while the client remains a free agent.”23  The varied ways in 
14. Id. at 52. 
15. See id. at 53-55.  Here, Illich does not use “right” and “left” in the way they 
are used in everyday American political discussions. 
16. Id. at 53-56. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 54. 
19. Id.; see also JOHN  BENDER, IMAGINING THE  PENITENTIARY (1987). Bender 
traces the parallel development of the novel and the modern penitentiary.  He notes, 
for instance, that the “old prisons neither told stories nor assigned roles.” Id. at 26.  But 
prison reformers, “beginning especially in England of the 1770s and prevailing through­
out America and Europe during the 1840s, envisioned prison interiors as precisely re­
fined instruments . . . .  [T]hey aimed to reshape the life story of each criminal by the 
measured application of pleasure and pain within a planned framework.” Id. at 22. 
20. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 54. 
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384 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:381 
which “service” is delivered, then, suggest that one may not judge 
an institution merely by its apparent purpose. 
II. SCHOOLS AS MANIPULATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
Illich labels schools as manipulative institutions, not convivial 
ones, so let us consider the extent to which they exhibit the three 
phenomena of right-wing enterprises: possession, definition, and 
production.  First, schools possess children in a very real way, clois­
tering them, and supposedly protecting them from the real world. 
Earlier in Deschooling, Illich reminds us that this arrangement is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, the idea of childhood having ap­
peared “along with the pocket watch and the Christian moneylend­
ers of the Renaissance.”24  Illich’s stance is supported by Neil 
Postman, who argues that the specific technological change that al­
lowed for the creation of childhood was the invention of the print­
ing press and the accompanying rise in literacy.25  In other words, 
childhood developed in response to the increasing technological so­
phistication of the adult world; such technology requiring more 
time to master.26 
Once imagined as a separate class, it is perhaps inevitable that 
the decision would be made to separate children from the adult 
world in order to properly educate them.  At the same time, classi­
fying children as young people who do not know or understand 
“the way things are” is an invitation to infantilize and manipulate 
them.  If the world is seen as too complex for children to fully un­
derstand, it logically follows—or so we are used to thinking—that 
children should not have to grapple with the realities of the world 
until they can fully comprehend them. The young, then, are set 
aside, set apart, and “prepared” for the real world.  Illich worries 
over this institutionalized irresponsibility, stating that the invention 
of “[c]hildhood” has resulted in a loss of “the dignity and maturity 
of the young.”27  His argument seems to say, “kids these days are 
too coddled,” the implication being that children need to learn 
24. Id. at 26. 
25. NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 36 (1982). 
26. More specifically, Postman argues that 
as the printing press played out its hand it became obvious that a new kind of 
adulthood had been invented.  From print onward, adulthood had to be 
earned.  It became a symbolic, not a biological achievement. From print on­
ward, the young would have to become adults, and they would have to do it by 
learning to read, by entering the world of typography. 
Id. 
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2012] ILLICH’S DESCHOOLING AND THE REDISCOVERY OF HOPE 385 
sooner about the harsh world they inhabit—they need to face the 
real world, as it were, which everyone knows is a cruel, unforgiving, 
and all-around tedious place to inhabit.  Illich’s conclusion, how­
ever, flips the usual complaint on its head.28  The current arrange­
ment, he implies, is to cloister the young, protecting them from the 
world’s cruel realities until they are of age, at which point they must 
deal with it.29  “If society were to outgrow its age of childhood,” he 
writes, “it would have to become livable for the young. The present 
disjunction between an adult society which pretends to be humane 
and a school environment which mocks reality could no longer be 
maintained.”30  In the present arrangement, children are ideally ini­
tiated little by little into adult life, but full responsibility is not de­
manded of them, if any responsibility is demanded at all, until they 
have come of age.  By this reasoning, schools not only possess the 
young, they define them.  Not only do children know nothing and 
understand nothing, they are incapable of responsibility.  It is worth 
noting that this arrangement is unfair to both children and adults— 
if the young are figured as wholly without responsibility, then it 
seems reasonable to conceive of adults as totally responsible.  As 
Illich notes, “[s]chool, by its very nature, tends to make a total 
claim on the time and energies of its participants. This, in turn, 
makes the teacher into custodian, preacher, and therapist.”31  In 
other words, teachers become totally responsible for childrens’ edu­
cation, which means teachers can be held totally accountable if the 
children fail to learn.32 
To possess and define children is really to objectify them. We 
often refer to children as our “most precious resource,” which al­
lows us to figure education as a production process.33  Resources 
28. Id. at 1-7. 
29. Id. at 26-33. 
30. Id. at 28.  Illich’s argument here is, to my mind, extremely optimistic.  It is not 
at all a sure thing that a culture freed from the idea of childhood will take notice of its 
own inhumane attributes and correct them.  The world was often cruel before the in­
vention of childhood, and there is a good chance its inhumane aspects would persist 
even if childhood disappeared.  In fact, Neil Postman, who was familiar with Illich’s 
work and even mentions Deschooling Society by name in his own work, The Disappear­
ance of Childhood, argues against Illich on this point. POSTMAN, supra note 25, at 139­
41.  He includes in his study a collection of child crime statistics that he suggests indi­
cate “both the decline of childhood and a corresponding diminution in the character of 
adulthood.” Id. at 134.  In short, Postman argues that the disappearance of childhood 
results not in a more humane world but in both crueler children and adults. Id. at 138. 
31. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 30. 
32. See, e.g., Clemmitt, supra note 2 (discussing the current push for high-stakes 
teacher evaluations). 
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386 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:381 
are not “useful” until they are developed or manipulated in such a 
way as to produce a useful object.  A cursory examination of educa­
tional language and metaphor makes clear the extent to which 
school is seen as a productive process. We constantly refer, for ex­
ample, to the production of roles; I have heard students referred to 
as “active learners,” “productive members of society,” “critical 
thinkers,” “smart consumers,” “responsible citizens,” and so forth. 
This is not at all the same as saying that the young will by experi­
ence (succeeding in some responsibilities and failing in others), dis­
cover the importance of learning for themselves, coming to 
understand what it means to be a member of a community, and 
recognizing the value of a skeptical, critical mind.  Instead, educa­
tion is seen as the process by which a child is shaped into one or 
more specific roles.34 
It is possible, as we see, to understand schools as meeting Il­
lich’s three criteria of manipulative institutions.35  In chapter six of 
Deschooling, “Learning Webs,” Illich outlines educational institu­
tions that he argues would be convivial instead of manipulative.36 
The main shift outlined in this chapter is that of the learner, from a 
passive recipient of institutional treatments to an active director of 
the child’s own educational interests.37  Illich refers to this sug­
gested system as “learning webs,” or “opportunity webs,” though, 
in relation to the term “web,” he notes, “I wish we had another 
word to designate such reticular structures for mutual access, a 
word less evocative of entrapment, less degraded by current usage 
and more suggestive of the fact that any such arrangement includes 
legal, organizational, and technical aspects.”38  The purpose of 
these networks is to provide all learners with broad access to “fair 
34. POSTMAN, supra note 3, at 125-26.  Postman specifically suggests that a mod­
ern child’s primary role is as a market: 
Children are neither blank tablets nor budding plants. They are markets . . . . 
There is very little the culture wants to do for children except to make them 
into consumers . . . .  In this conception, a child’s mind is not the pages of a 
book, and a child is not a plant to be pruned.  A child is an economic creature, 
not different from an adult, whose sense of worth is to be founded entirely on 
his or her capacity to secure material benefits, and whose purpose is to fuel a 
market economy. 
Id. 
35. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 53-56. 
36. Id. at 72. 
37. Id. at 73. 
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use” educational objects, as well as other interested, skilled, or 
knowledgeable individuals, with only minimal restrictions.39 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES 
Thus far, I have attempted to outline, with some commentary, 
the basic argument that runs throughout Illich’s Deschooling Soci­
ety.40  At this point, I think it is necessary to briefly cover two 
prominent aspects of the educational “reforms” Illich proposes in 
“Learning Webs,”41 and to consider a couple of problems with 
those aspects.  I use the word “problem” here both because some 
will find the implications of Illich’s proposals truly problematic, and 
because those proposals, though meant to be solutions to social and 
educational problems discussed earlier in Deschooling, carry their 
own attendant difficulties. 
First, let us consider the economic implications of Illich’s pro­
posals.  As noted above, Illich is interested in creating educational 
structures that give a learner broad access to educational objects 
and skilled, knowledgeable individuals.42  He goes on to argue that 
[i]n a world which is controlled and owned by nations and corpo­
rations, only limited access to educational objects will ever be 
possible.  But increased access to those objects which can be 
shared for educational purposes may enlighten us enough to help 
us to break through these ultimate political barriers.  Public 
schools transfer control over the educational uses of objects from 
private to professional hands.  The institutional inversion of 
schools could empower the individual to reclaim the right to use 
them for education.  A truly public kind of ownership might be­
gin to emerge if private or corporate control over the educational 
aspect of “things” were brought to the vanishing point.43 
Here, Illich appears to suggest that private property should be se­
verely restricted.  This suggestion, I imagine, would indeed be prob­
lematic for many individuals, and it would be easy to dismiss his 
39. Id. at 77-79.  The terminology Illich uses to describe his proposed learning 
webs is strikingly similar to that of the Internet.  While the similarities and differences 
between Illich’s learning webs and the Internet’s structure deserve some sustained criti­
cal attention, I do not feel the need to give it that attention here.  It is enough to note 
that the Internet can fill to a significant extent the educational niches Illich outlines in 
this chapter, though the ability of one to take full advantage of its resources and oppor­
tunities is still too highly dependent on individual technological investment. 
40. ILLICH, supra note 4. 
41. Id. at 72-73. 
42. Id. at 77-79. 
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388 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:381 
argument as extreme and wholly unrealistic.  But Illich’s property 
concerns are actually quite similar to debates about the role of pri­
vate property in a democracy that have persisted throughout much 
of American history, and it would be worthwhile to step aside 
briefly and consider some of that history. 
In his book, The Revolt of the Elites, Christopher Lasch in part 
focuses on the history of early Americans’ emphasis on property 
ownership and its relation to competence and independence.44  Jef­
ferson, of course, is well known to have thought that the ideal dem­
ocratic society was one of small, independent farmers.45  This ideal 
was still visible, Lasch argues, when Lincoln signed the Homestead 
Act into law: 
The vision of the ideal democrat as the self-respecting artisan or 
agrarian in “his own workshop, . . . his own house,” in the words 
of George Henry Evans, found legislative expression in the 
Homestead Act of 1862, which Lincoln hoped would give “every 
man” the “means and opportunity of bettering his condition.”  In 
the same speech in which he recommended the homestead policy 
on these grounds, Lincoln referred to “working men” as the “ba­
sis of all governments”—a pretty good indication that he con­
ceived of property as a means not of escaping from labor but of 
realizing its full potential.46 
The point Lasch attempts to make here is that property ownership 
is important for developing competent and independent democratic 
citizens, because it teaches the value of labor and learning at the 
same time—they are intertwined.  This fusion of labor and learning 
was fundamental to the way in which early Americans understood 
themselves as opposed to their European counterparts.47  “In Eu­
rope,” Lasch writes, “the laboring classes allegedly lived on the 
verge of destitution, but it was not only their poverty that staggered 
Americans but their exclusion from civic life, from the world of 
learning and culture—from all the influences that stimulate intellec­
tual curiosity and broaden people’s intellectual horizons.”48  He as­
serts that, unlike modern Americans, early Americans would have 
understood the idea of “equal opportunity” to be “a matter more of 
44. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 7-8 (1995). 
45. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (October 28, 1785), 
in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 395-398 (1977). 
46. LASCH, supra note 44, at 71. 
47. Id. at 59. 
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intellectual than of material enrichment.  It was their restless curi­
osity, their skeptical and iconoclastic turn of mind, their resource­
fulness and self-reliance, their capacity for invention and 
improvisation that most dramatically seemed to differentiate the la­
boring classes in America from their European counterparts.”49 
When Lincoln, then, stated that he hoped the Homestead Act 
would provide every man the means for “bettering his condition,” 
he was not primarily speaking, as we do now, of material or mone­
tary accumulation.  Lasch explains that Lincoln 
[i]n his 1859 speech to the Wisconsin Agricultural Society, . . . 
upheld a norm of intensive agriculture diametrically opposed to 
the wasteful, migratory habits of those who saw land merely as a 
source of speculative profit.  He condemned the “ambition for 
broad acres,” which encouraged “careless, half performed, slov­
enly work.”  He spoke highly of the “effect of thorough cultiva­
tion upon the farmer’s mind.”  He said that is would prove an 
“exhaustless source of profitable enjoyment” to a “mind, already 
trained to thought, in the country school, or higher school.”  Nur­
ture, not acquisition, was the burden of his exhortation.50 
Despite Lincoln’s words, America was already moving toward 
a culture in which learning and labor were separated, and thus, a 
culture in which the learned and the laboring were two separate 
classes.51  Concern for this cultural shift can be seen in Thoreau’s, 
Walden, first published in 1854, though begun nearly a decade 
before Lincoln’s speech.52  Much has been written about Thoreau’s 
skepticism in Walden regarding technological progress, the fruits of 
which he calls “pretty toys, which distract our attention from seri­
ous things.”53  One modern convenience at which he directed his 
criticism was the railroad.  Some of this disdain for the railroad was 
surely personal; its arrival had turned Concord, Massachusetts, 
Thoreau’s home, into essentially a suburb of Boston, which he saw 
as no good thing.54  At the same time, however, his criticism of the 
railroad focuses significantly on the degraded circumstances of the 
laborers who built it.  He writes: 
49. Id. at 59. 
50. Id. at 71-72. 
51. Id. at 72-73. 
52. Henry David Thoreau, Walden; or, Life in the Woods, in THOREAU: A WEEK 
ON THE  CONCORD AND  MERRIMACK  RIVERS; WALDEN; THE  MAINE  WOODS; CAPE 
COD. 321 (1985). 
53. Thoreau, supra note 52, at 363. 
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It is a mistake to suppose that, in a country where the usual evi­
dences of civilization exist, the condition of a very large body of 
the inhabitants may not be as degraded as that of savages. . . . To 
know this I should not need to look further than to the shanties 
which every where border our railroads, that last improvement of 
civilization; where I see in my daily walks human beings living in 
sties, and all winter with an open door, for the sake of light, with­
out any visible, often imaginable, wood pile, and the forms of 
both old and young are permanently contracted by the long habit 
of shrinking from cold and misery, and the development of all 
their limbs and faculties is checked.  It certainly is fair to look at 
that class by whose labor the works which distinguish this genera­
tion are accomplished.55 
Thoreau’s description here is blunt and effective, and the biting sar­
casm of the quote’s final sentence belies his disdain for the inherent 
inequity he sees in the railroad, as well as for those Americans who 
turn a blind eye to it.  It is also notable that Thoreau here makes a 
point of highlighting the impact of physical hardship on both the 
laborers’ physical and mental health, writing that the cold and mis­
ery checks “the development of all their limbs and faculties.”56  This 
concern for the lack of intellectual stimulation in such wage labor 
appears again, following further criticism of the railroad.57  Thoreau 
recognizes and addresses the natural desire for laborers to take 
pride in their work, to think of it as worthwhile and valuable to 
society, no matter how degrading: 
‘What!’ exclaim a million Irishmen starting up from all the shan­
ties in the land, ‘is not this railroad which we have built a good 
thing?’  Yes, I answer, comparatively good, that is, you might 
have done worse; but I wish, as you are brothers of mine, that 
you could have spent your time better than digging in this dirt.58 
Here, of course, Thoreau means that he wishes they might have 
spent their time better than only digging in the dirt (he himself 
spends a good bit of his time at Walden digging in the dirt).59  As he 
repeatedly reminds us in Walden, part of his project there was to 
discover for himself how little dirt digging was required to sustain a 
full intellectual life: “I do not wish to be any more busy with my 
hands than is necessary.  My head is hands and feet.  I feel all my 
55. Thoreau, supra note 52, at 350. 
56. Id. (emphasis added). 
57. Id. at 364-65. 
58. Id. at 365. 
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best faculties concentrated in it.”60  For Thoreau, it is thoroughly 
lamentable that the “million Irishmen” building the nation’s rail­
roads are forced by circumstances to live only in hands and feet, 
while their higher faculties atrophy. 
Of greater concern to Thoreau, at least in terms of his audience 
for Walden, is what he sees as the atrophy of both the physical and 
mental faculties of that class of Americans who most benefit from 
the division of labor.  This is where Thoreau’s concern for the inter­
twined nature of labor and learning is most clearly visible.  He ar­
gues that by avoiding labor, and in some cases developing a general 
contempt for it, the leisure class does not further develop their 
mental faculties but neglects them as well: “Where is this division of 
labor to end?” he asks, “and what object does it finally serve?  No 
doubt another may also think for me; but it is not therefore desira­
ble that he should do so to the exclusion of my thinking for my­
self.”61  But Thoreau sees that some of his fellow Americans are 
indeed allowing others to labor and think for them, which, for him, 
is analogous to dying: 
Much it concerns a man, forsooth, how a few sticks are slanted 
over him or under him, and what colors are daubed upon his box. 
It would signify somewhat, if, in any earnest sense, he slanted 
them and daubed it; but the spirit having departed out of the 
tenant, it is of a piece with constructing his own coffin,—architec­
ture of the grave, and ‘carpenter,’ is but another name for ‘coffin­
maker.’62 
It is only by combining learning and labor, Thoreau suggests, that 
people may realize the full potential of their faculties: “Who knows 
but if men constructed their dwellings with their own hands, and 
provided food for themselves and families simply and honestly 
enough, the poetic faculty would be universally developed, as birds 
universally sing when they are so engaged?”63 
The ideal of citizen as property-owner and artisan or agrarian 
persisted for some time,64 despite the obvious fact that many citi­
zens were, as Thoreau perceived, excluded or distracted from that 
ideal.65  But the concerns of Thoreau and others went unheeded for 
60. Id. at 400. 
61. Id. at 359. 
62. Id. at 360. 
63. Id. at 359. 
64. LASCH, supra note 44, at 62. 
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the most part—there was just too much money to be made, and 
Lasch writes that 
[b]y the end of the nineteenth century the “dignity of labor” had 
become an empty phrase, uttered without conviction on ritual oc­
casions.  The “laboring classes” no longer referred to the vast 
majority of self-reliant, self-respecting citizens; the term now re­
ferred to a permanent class of hirelings, escape from which ap­
peared to be the only compelling definition of opportunity.66 
It was, he argues, the closing of the frontier that finally made 
America’s class problem too visible to ignore: 
The Census Bureau’s announcement, in 1890, that the country no 
longer “had a frontier of settlement” almost immediately took on 
enormous symbolic importance.  This “brief official statement,” 
. . . gave new urgency to debates about the “social question.” 
More than any other development, the closing of the frontier 
forced Americans to reckon with the proletarianization of labor, 
the growing gulf between wealth and poverty, and the tendency 
of each to become hereditary.67 
Lasch notes, though, that America has never really fully reckoned 
with the problems of wage labor, economic disparity, and inherited 
privilege and poverty.68  He spends much of this portion of Revolt 
of the Elites discussing how we have distracted ourselves from these 
problems by shifting our focus from true equality in citizenship to 
equal opportunity—or social mobility—as well as equality of lan­
guage.69  He writes, 
The recognition of equal rights is a necessary but insufficient con­
dition of democratic citizenship.  Unless everyone has equal ac­
cess to the means of competence (as we might speak of them), 
equal rights will not confer self-respect. . . . Political equality— 
citizenship—equalizes people who are otherwise unequal in their 
capacities, and the universalization of citizenship therefore has to 
be accompanied . . . by measures designed to assure the broadest 
distribution of economic and political responsibility [possible].70 
66. LASCH, supra note 44, at 72-73. 
67. Id. at 73. 
68. Id. at 77-78. 
69. LASCH, supra note 44, at 50-91.  Illich himself, in the opening chapter of 
Deschooling, argues that, whatever language we use to frame public school, it does 
not—and cannot in its current form—promote anything approaching real equality, as 
economic status plays too strong a role in determining whether or not a student will be 
successful in school. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 6. 
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Lasch doesn’t exactly call for public ownership of property here, as 
Illich essentially does in Deschooling,71 but he suggests an arrange­
ment of property, responsibility, and competency that is similar to 
Illich’s, while placing it within a tradition of American democratic 
thought.  Illich’s and Lasch’s arguments are connected by a shared 
emphasis on, in Lasch’s words, “equal access to the means of com­
petence,”72 which, it seems to me, is what Illich hopes his proposed 
learning webs and expanded public property will provide.  In the 
first chapter of Deschooling, Illich notes, 
It should be obvious that even with schools of equal quality a 
poor child can seldom catch up with a rich one.  Even if they 
attend equal schools and begin at the same age, poor children 
lack most of the educational opportunities which are casually 
available to the middle-class child. These advantages range from 
conversation and books in the home to vacation travel and a dif­
ferent sense of oneself, and apply, for the child who enjoys them, 
both in and out of school.  So the poorer student will generally 
fall behind so long as he depends on school for advancement or 
learning.73 
In Lasch’s language, Illich here argues that, given the current class 
and property structure, it is folly to expect schools alone to equalize 
the means of competence, because middle- and upper-class students 
will always possess greater means outside of school for their intel­
lectual development.  This problem is what underpins Illich’s con­
cern for property and why his proposals take the form they do. 
Let us consider, in closing out this section, one of Illich’s sug­
gestions in “Learning Webs,” examining its property implications, 
and judging just how radical a proposal it is.  He writes, 
If the goals of learning were no longer dominated by schools and 
schoolteachers, the market for learners would be much more va­
rious and the definition of “educational artifacts” would be less 
restrictive.  There could be tool shops, libraries, laboratories, and 
gaming rooms.  Photo labs and offset presses would allow neigh­
borhood newspapers to flourish.  Some storefront learning cen­
ters could contain viewing booths for closed-circuit television, 
others could feature office equipment for use and for repair. The 
jukebox or the record player would be commonplace, with some 
specializing in classical music, others in international folk tunes, 
others in jazz.  Film clubs would compete with each other and 
71. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 86-87. 
72. LASCH, supra note 44, at 88. 
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with commercial television.  Museum outlets could be networks 
for circulating exhibits of works of art, both old and new, origi­
nals and reproductions, perhaps administered by the various met­
ropolitan museums.74 
If we overlook the outdated technology referenced here, which is 
really of no consequence anyway, it is easy to see that the reposito­
ries of educational artifacts described by Illich resemble public 
lending libraries.  Though we are so used to them that we may over­
look this fact, public libraries are specifically meant to address the 
issue of equal opportunity to some of the means of competence, a 
purpose that has persisted since the first lending libraries were es­
tablished in America.75  In his autobiography, Ben Franklin relates 
his role in the creation of a subscription library in Philadelphia.76 
He writes, 
At the time I establish’d myself in Pennsylvania, there was not a 
good bookseller’s shop in any of the colonies to the southward of 
Boston.  In New York and Philad’a the printers were indeed sta­
tioners; they sold only paper, etc., almanacs, ballads, and a few 
common school-books.  Those who lov’d reading were oblig’d to 
send for their books from England . . .  I propos’d to render the 
benefit from books more common, by commencing a public sub­
scription library . . . .  So few were the readers at that time in 
Philadelphia, and the majority of us so poor, that I was not able, 
with great industry, to find more than fifty persons, mostly young 
tradesmen, willing to pay down for this purpose forty shillings 
each, and ten shillings per annum.  On this little fund we began 
. . . .  The institution soon manifested its utility, was imitated by 
other towns, and in other provinces. The libraries were aug­
mented by donations; reading became fashionable; and our peo­
ple, having no public amusements to divert their attention from 
study, became better acquainted with books, and in a few years 
were observ’d by strangers to be better instructed and more intel­
ligent than people of the same rank generally are in other 
countries.77 
As is evident in the preceding quotation, in Franklin’s case, the li­
brary was a means of addressing resource scarcity.  Illich’s reposito­
ries are also meant to address resource scarcity, but he asserts that 
74. Id. at 84. 
75. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE COLLECTION OF BIOGRAPHY AND AUTOBIOGRA­
PHY 62 (1961). 
76. Id. at 62-63. 
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it is an artificial scarcity.78  The artifacts he lists are available, and 
generally in great numbers, but the barriers of capital and institu­
tional interest restrict their use.79  In one way or another, then, edu­
cational equality comes back to the issue of property. Franklin and 
his peers shared in a general lack of property in the form of books, 
and so nearly everyone benefited from the greater number of books 
made available through the library.80  Illich’s repositories sound 
radical, on the other hand, because so many of us already have ac­
cess, in one way or another, to the sorts of property (educational 
artifacts) he lists, and so we are likely to feel as if something has 
been taken from us if that property becomes publicly instead of pri­
vately owned. 
IV. STANDARDS AND AUTHORITY 
Even if Illich’s suggestions regarding private property were ac­
cepted, one might still reject his learning webs on the grounds that 
they would make it impossible to develop common standards of ex­
cellence or legitimate authority. Without institutional authority, 
who will determine what constitutes good work, accurate knowl­
edge, or even truth?  In short, if Illich gets his way, what is to keep 
learning webs from descending into anarchy?  He does not directly 
address this issue, noting only that 
[d]eschooling education should increase—rather than stifle—the 
search for men with practical wisdom who would be willing to 
sustain the newcomer in his educational adventure.  As masters 
of their art abandon the claim to be superior informants or skill 
models, their claim to superior wisdom will begin to ring true.81 
This statement is maddeningly vague, but I think we can tease out 
Illich’s point here.  Within manipulative institutions, claims to supe­
rior skill, knowledge, or wisdom are always suspect—they are just 
as likely as not to be another form of manipulation.  Once the insti­
tutional framework has been stripped away, Illich implies, such 
claims will again carry weight, as a learner will be free to interro­
gate their veracity.  This is an intriguing notion, but it still lacks the 
sort of specificity necessary for it to be compelling. 
A more concrete way that common standards of excellence 
and legitimate authority might be achieved within learning webs is 
78. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 79-87. 
79. Id. at 79-83. 
80. FRANKLIN, supra note 75, at 62. 
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by combining Illich’s ideas with Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of a 
“practice,” as presented in his book, After Virtue.82  MacIntyre de­
fines a practice as 
any coherent and complex form of socially established coopera­
tive human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those stan­
dards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially defini­
tive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an 
example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with 
skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess.  Bricklaying is 
not a practice; architecture is.  Planting turnips is not a practice; 
farming is.  So are the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biol­
ogy, and so is the work of the historian, and so are painting and 
music.83 
What one immediately notices in this definition of a practice is that 
the examples given are familiar to us as fields, vocations, or trades 
in which one might find employment.  What is significant, though, is 
the extent to which these practices are subsumed and compromised 
by institutions concerned primarily with what MacIntyre calls exter­
nal goods.84 
In explaining goods internal to and external to a practice, 
MacIntyre uses the example of a child who is enticed to the game of 
chess with the promise of candy, a certain amount just for playing, 
and an additional portion if he or she is able to win the game.85  As 
MacIntyre notes, “so long as it is the candy alone which provides 
the child with a good reason for playing chess, the child has no rea­
son not to cheat and every reason to cheat, provided he or she can 
do so successfully.”86  The hope, though, is that there will come a 
time when the child will become motivated to play chess not on the 
promise of candy but because he or she 
will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a 
certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagina­
tion and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now 
82. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007). 
83. Id. at 187. 
84. Id. at 194. 
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not just for winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to 
excel in whatever way the game of chess demands.87 
As this example shows, external and internal goods differ in vital 
ways.  External goods are “contingently attached to . . . practices by 
the accidents of social circumstance—in the case of the imaginary 
child candy, in the case of real adults such goods as prestige, status 
and money.”88  What is crucial, MacIntyre notes, is that there “are 
always alternative ways for achieving [external] goods, and their 
achievement is never to be had only by engaging in some particular 
kind of practice,” not to mention that such goods tend to promote a 
success-at-all-costs approach to a practice.89  Internal goods, on the 
other hand, are goods that can be achieved only within the bounda­
ries of the practice itself.  “We call them internal,” MacIntyre 
writes, 
for two reasons: first, as I have already suggested, because we can 
only specify them in terms of chess or some other game [or prac­
tice] of that specific kind and by means of examples from such 
games [or practices] . . .  and secondly because they can only be 
identified and recognized by the experience of participating in 
the practice in question.  Those who lack the relevant experience 
are incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods.90 
Perhaps most important, as MacIntyre goes on to note, is that 
[e]xternal goods are . . . characteristically objects of competition 
in which there must be losers as well as winners.  Internal goods 
are indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is charac­
teristic of them that their achievement is good for the whole com­
munity who participate in the practice.91 
If we revisit the Illich quote at the beginning of this section, we 
can see that he may have in mind something very much like 
MacIntyre’s notion of a practice.92  When Illich refers to “masters 
of their art,”93 it is likely that he is thinking of master craftsmen, 
artisans, practitioners, etc.—individuals who have mastered their 
respective practices by pursuing and achieving primarily goods in­




90. Id. at 188-89. 
91. Id. at 190-91. 
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individuals, and the practices they represent, offer the best and rela­
tively accessible and open framework within which common stan­
dards and legitimate authority can properly function.  As MacIntyre 
explains, 
[a] practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to 
rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a prac­
tice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inade­
quacy of my own performance as judged by them.  It is to subject 
my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the stan­
dards which currently and partially define the practice.  Practices 
of course, as I have just noticed, have a history: games, sciences 
and arts all have histories.  Thus the standards are not themselves 
immune from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be initiated 
into a practice without accepting the authority of the best stan­
dards realized so far.  If, on starting to listen to music, I do not 
accept my own incapacity to judge correctly, I will never learn to 
hear, let alone to appreciate, Bartok’s last quartets.  If, on start­
ing to play baseball, I do not accept that others know better than 
I when to throw a fast ball and when not, I will never learn to 
appreciate good pitching let alone to pitch.94 
If practices, however, are to provide the common standards and au­
thority needed within Illich’s learning webs, there are at least two 
prerequisites.  First, and most obviously, learners must be free to 
enter into any practice they desire, though their success within that 
practice is not guaranteed.  Second, experienced master practition­
ers must embody the standards and authority of practices and not 
simply record them in institutional documents as rules and regula­
tions.  This second prerequisite is vital, not only for the obvious rea­
son that living traditions are the only sort that carry any authority, 
but also because the standards of any practice are generated and 
extended through the pursuit of goods internal to that practice, 
which can only be pursued by individuals, not institutions. This is 
even the case when institutions exist primarily for the purpose of 
supporting and promoting a particular practice.  As MacIntyre 
points out, institutions and the practices they support are, by na­
ture, always already in a precarious relationship: 
Practices must not be confused with institutions.  Chess, physics 
and medicine are practices; chess clubs, laboratories, universities 
and hospitals are institutions.  Institutions are characteristically 
and necessarily concerned with what I have called external 
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goods.  They are involved in acquiring money and other material 
goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, and they 
distribute money, power and status as rewards.  Nor could they 
do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also 
the practices of which they are the bearers. For no practices can 
survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions.  Indeed 
so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions—and 
consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the 
practices in question—that institutions and practices characteris­
tically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the crea­
tivity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness 
of the institution. . . .95 
The ramifications of this precarious relationship are not difficult to 
discern, but let us briefly consider them, as they take us right back 
to Illich. 
The relationship between internal and external goods is such 
that the pursuit of internal goods at times happily coincides with the 
achievement of external goods (money, power, prestige).  In such 
cases, a practice’s standards carry real weight and are easily ex­
tended by practitioners and the institution that supports them.  At 
other times, the pursuit of some internal goods may actually work 
against the realization of external goods, in which case there are at 
least two possible outcomes.  First, if the supply of external goods is 
sufficient, a practice’s practitioners and supporting institutions will 
generally be in alignment, though each side will harbor some de­
gree of ambivalence about the other.  Second, if the supply of exter­
nal goods is low enough to threaten the viability of an institution, 
the standards of the practice that institution supports effectively 
cease to matter—an institution will inevitably sacrifice them for the 
sake of its own continued viability.  As MacIntyre illustrates in his 
chess-playing child example, once external goods become the pri­
mary motivator for participation in a practice, there is no reason 
not to cheat,96 or, in Illich’s terminology, “manipulate[ ].”97  This 
institutional cheating/manipulation comes in various forms, but it 
always has the effect of undermining the standards and authority of 
the practice represented by the institution.98  Because such under­
95. Id. at 194. 
96. Id. at 188. 
97. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 53-54. 
98. Id.  Illich, for example, refers to a “boomerang effect in war,” such that “a 
higher . . . body count” means “more enemies,” and so a country “must  spend to create 
. . .  manipulative institution[s] . . .  in a futile effort to absorb the side effects of war.” 
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mining of standards and authority can in turn lead to a reduction of 
an institution’s power and prestige, that institution must ironically 
engage in further manipulation—at the very least engaging in what 
we commonly call “spin”—in an attempt to cover up or distract 
from its hypocrisy.99 
Looking again at Illich’s proposed learning webs, this time 
through the lens of MacIntyre’s conception of a practice, we might 
see his desire to redistribute property from private hands to the 
public’s as an attempt to limit the circumstances under which insti­
tutions become manipulative.  Property (wealth and the power and 
prestige that come with it) is an external good, so Illich’s move to 
increase the public’s ownership of and access to educational prop­
erty is meant to help prevent his proposed learning webs—which 
are of course institutions—from facing circumstances likely to re­
sult in their having to manipulate to survive. 
V. REDISCOVERING HOPE 
There is an issue that remains, though. Illich’s learning webs 
are meant to facilitate learning, not support chess players, cabinet­
makers, historians, physicists, or other “masters of their art” en­
gaged in other practices.100  If common standards and authority are 
to be found in experienced master practitioners, where are we to 
find such people, and what institutions will support them?  Illich’s 
proposed property rearrangement would seriously imperil the via­
bility of those remaining institutions that at least ostensibly support 
specific practices, which implies that he expects or hopes that those 
practices will persist by other means.  At the beginning of 
Deschooling, after all, he notes, 
of criminals, [and], in fact, it often creates them out of mere nonconformists.” Id. He 
goes on to argue “that mental hospitals, nursing homes, and orphan asylums do much 
the same thing . . .  provid[ing]  their clients with the destructive self-image of the 
psychotic, the overaged, or the waif. . . .” Id. 
99. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Wendell Berry Takes Back His Papers, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 2010, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/wendell-berry-takes-back­
his-papers/; Cheryl Truman, Wendell Berry Pulling His Personal Papers from UK, LEX­
INGTON  HERALD-LEADER (June 23, 2010), http://www.kentucky.com/2010/06/23/ 
1319383/wendell-berry-pulling-his-personal.html#ixzz0rgeddtAJ (discussing the contro­
versy surrounding the University of Kentucky’s decision to name its new basketball 
dorm the “Wildcat Coal Lodge” in exchange for a sizable donation from the Kentucky 
coal industry, which led celebrated Kentucky author, and UK alumnus, Wendell Berry 
to withdraw his papers from the university). 
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I have chosen the school as my paradigm, and I therefore deal 
only indirectly with other bureaucratic agencies of the corporate 
state: the consumer-family, the party, the army, the church, the 
media.  My analysis of the hidden curriculum of school should 
make it evident that public education would profit from the 
deschooling of society, just as family life, politics, security, faith, 
and communication would profit from an analogous process.101 
The deschooling process as framed by Illich is clearly meant, then, 
to not be peculiar to education but to be representative of the sort 
of change he sees as needed throughout our culture (hence 
Deschooling Society, and not, Reforming Our Schools). 
Once we recognize that Illich’s proposed learning webs suggest 
not just a reformed education system but a wholly refigured culture, 
the final chapter of Deschooling, whose inclusion may at first ap­
pear a bit peculiar, takes on a new importance. This chapter, “The 
Rebirth of Epimethean Man,” focuses on the difference between 
hope and expectation, which is exemplified for Illich in the story of 
Prometheus, Epimetheus, and Pandora: 
The original Pandora . . . was an Earth goddess in prehistoric 
matriarchal Greece.  She let all ills escape from her amphora . . . 
But she closed the lid before Hope could escape. The history of 
modern man . . . is the history of the Promethean endeavor to 
forge institutions in order to corral each of the rampant ills.  It is 
the history of fading hope and rising expectations.102 
If our culture has embraced the Promethean ethos, it has, according 
to Illich, completely forgotten Prometheus’s brother, Epimetheus. 
He writes, “[t]he Greeks told the story of two brothers, Prometheus 
and Epimetheus.  The former warned the latter to leave Pandora 
alone.  Instead, he married her.”103  The brothers’ differing atti­
tudes toward Pandora represent two responses to the idea of hope. 
On the one hand, hope is forsaken in favor of expectation; on the 
other hand, hope is embraced.  Illich argues that we have forgotten 
the distinction between hope and expectation, and it is a distinction 
that must be rediscovered: 
Hope, in its strong sense, means trusting faith in the goodness of 
nature, while expectation, as I will use it here, means reliance on 
results which are planned and controlled by man.  Hope centers 
desire on a person from whom we await a gift.  Expectation looks 
101. Id. at 2. 
102. Id. at 105. 
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forward to satisfaction from a predictable process which will pro­
duce what we have the right to claim. The Promethean ethos has 
now eclipsed hope.  Survival of the human race depends on its 
rediscovery as a social force.104 
One way to read Illich here is to see him, in light of his emphasis on 
hope, as wanting us to return to a more primitive world.  He notes 
that “[p]rimitive man lived in [a] world of hope.  He relied on the 
munificence of nature, on the handouts of gods, and on the instincts 
of his tribe to enable him to subsist.”105  Illich, however, doesn’t 
present such a world of hope as a lost ideal so much as he labors to 
illuminate the ways in which a wholly planned world, a world built 
around expectations, ironically traps us in our attempts to eliminate 
life’s ills.106  He writes, 
[m]an has developed the frustrating power to demand anything 
because he cannot visualize anything which an institution cannot 
do for him.  Surrounded by all-powerful tools, man is reduced to 
a tool of his tools.  Each of the institutions meant to exorcise one 
of the primeval evils has become a fail-safe, self-sealing coffin for 
man.  Man is trapped in the boxes he makes to contain the ills 
Pandora allowed to escape . . . .  Quite suddenly we find our­
selves in the darkness of our own trap.107 
Such an ironic fate is one born of hubris, Illich suggests, and indeed 
another way to consider his hope-expectation dichotomy is as a 
humility-hubris spectrum.  Prometheus is, in fact, guilty of classic 
hubris.  As Illich notes, Prometheus “tricked the gods out of their 
monopoly of fire, taught men to use it in the forging of iron, be­
came the god of technologists, and wound up in iron chains.”108 
And he makes a point of referencing two other mythical figures, 
both guilty of hubris, and both of whom are punished through un­
ceasingly frustrated expectations: 
Sisyphus, who for a while had chained Thanatos (death), must 
roll a heavy stone up the hill to the pinnacle of Hell, and the 
stone always slips from his grip just when he is about to reach the 
top.  Tantalus, who was invited by the gods to share their meal, 
and on that occasion stole their secret of how to prepare all-heal­
ing ambrosia, which bestowed immortality, suffers eternal hunger 
104. Id. at 105-06. 
105. Id. at 106. 
106. Id. at 53-54.  A reiteration of the “boomerang effect” that Illich describes 
earlier in Deschooling. 
107. Id. at 109. 
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and thirst standing in a river of receding waters, overshadowed 
by fruit trees with receding branches.109 
These figures should, Illich argues, serve to warn us of the paradox 
of progress: “A world of ever-rising demands is not just evil—it can 
be spoken of only as Hell.”110 
CONCLUSION 
We can see, then, that Illich addresses only partially and 
vaguely the issues of common standards and authority in regard to 
his learning webs, because, as I suspect he would point out, they are 
just the sort of problems one would dwell on who knows only a 
world of expectation.  To design a learning system in which stan­
dards and authority take precedence is, he would argue, to design 
anew the sort of manipulative institution he wishes to eliminate— 
questions of standards and authority are, after all, questions of con­
trol.  Institutions organized around expectations—manipulative in­
stitutions—may seek to eliminate the disappointment, pain, and 
unpredictability of life, but in the process they will always ironically 
prevent us from being fully human. The structure of institutions 
organized around hope is necessarily vague, on the other hand, be­
cause such institutions treat humans as ends, seeking, despite inevi­
table disappointments, to allow us to act freely and, from time to 
time, perhaps realize our own transcendent potential.  If such an 
arrangement sounds overly hopeful to our modern ears, perhaps 
that is Illich’s point. 







      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 36 Side B      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE204.txt unknown Seq: 24 13-AUG-12 9:18
